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Abstract. This article highlights the sequences of logic that can thwart counterterrorist analysis and 
operations and optimize the political benefits of a terrorist's biological warfare operations. 
 
Recent journalistic accounts intimate that a "mysterious disease" observed in a remote part of 
Afghanistan might possibly be the consequence of a biological warfare (BW) operation. The multiplicity 
and complexity of the logical sequences that must be considered in arriving at such a determination are 
allies of the BW terrorist. 
 
Is there a consistent set of symptoms? Even if there is, the set may have multiple causes--some BW-
related, some not. Is there no consistent set of symptoms? Even if there is not, there may be just a 
single cause--e.g., a BW or non-BW cause--with different manifestations. 
 
Is it helpful to compare the quality, incidence, and prevalence of a symptom outbreak with 
epidemiological history? Not as helpful as one might think. Consistency with history might suggest that 
the outbreak is a "natural" one. However, a BW planner might choose a BW agent that would induce 
symptoms consistent with a particular aspect of natural history. On the other hand, inconsistency with 
history might indicate something new in quality, incidence, and prevalence due not to BW but novel 
changes in mutation or vector mobility--the sorts of changes that have often enough been exemplified 
in the annals of medical history. 
 
Can one obtain a "fix" on differentiating "natural" occurrence from BW operation based on social 
behavioral phenomena preceding a symptom outbreak? One problem is that the time lapse between 
introduction of a BW agent and a symptom outbreak can geometrically increase the number of 
phenomena that would have to be observed or identified and that might have a causal relationship with 
the outbreak. And these phenomena may be much more resistant to observation and identification than 
the Russian "yellow rain" that many experts believe was a form of trichothecene mycotoxins but others 
still insist was only bee feces. 
 
Can the various political treaties, protocols, and conventions bearing on proscriptions of BW 
development, stockpiling, deployments, and employments contribute not only to the deterrence of BW 
operations but to their identification as well? To the contrary: the political, economic, and military 
fallout of going public with allegations--even those that seem overwhelmingly to be fact--militate 
against accurate identification. This impediment to identification is especially likely when bureaucracies 
with competing agencies and multiple turf battles within a fast-paced, ever-changing world are involved 
in the process. Something like this may have happened in some United Nations (UN) Security Council 
members' hesitance to support the UN Special Commission's findings on the Iraqi BW program. 
 
Thus, the logical sequences that must be confronted by counter-BW authorities--the sequences of logic 
of the BW terrorist--render BW a more challenging analytic and operational problem than other 
weapons of mass destruction. These sequences also suggest that there may be a place for cognitive 
psychologists and philosophers in the BW counterterrorist effort. (See Biological warfare as 
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psychological warfare. (March 13, 1998). IBPP, 4(10); Cole, L.A. (1996). The specter of biological 
weapons. Scientific American, 275, 60-65; Larsen, R.J., & Kadlec, R.P. (1998). Biological warfare: A silent 
threat to America's defense transportation system. Strategic Review, 26, 5-10; Leitenberg, M. (1997). 
Biological weapons, international sanctions and proliferation. Asian Perspectives, 21, 7-39; Miller, J. 
(February 20, 1999). Outbreak in Afghan region concerns W.H.O. The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com.) (Keywords: Afghanistan, Biological Warfare.) 
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